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ABSTRACT 
Recent discussions of gentrification in the UK have centred on new builds and on the 
influence of particular public programmes. This paper focuses on a form of gentrification 
that has cut across both of these: buy-to-let, broadly defined as the purchase and transfer of 
a dwelling to the private rental market. Initiated in response to a favourable legislative and 
financial context, this form of property investment has not usually been considered as 
gentrification, likely because it is at odds with the historical link between gentrification and 
ownership in the UK, poses problems with consumption side explanations and is not seen as 
displacing low-income residents. The paper uses a detailed comparison of small-area social 
and tenure data from the 2001 and 2011 UK Censuses to show that buy-to-let has become a 
prominent tenure trajectory in gentrifying neighbourhoods. This prominence emerges from 
the opportunity it affords to use the general value gap created by the deregulation of the 
private rental sector to close rent gaps in the most urban, central and disadvantaged areas 
of England. This tenure shift, shown to be intrinsically linked to gentrification, creates vast 
opportunities for asset appreciation but also initiates long term trajectories of displacement 
in surrounding areas. 
Keywords: Gentrification, buy-to-let, private rental sector, tenure, displacement 
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INTRODUCTION 
The last 25 years have seen a strong return of the private rental sector (PRS) in the UK. This 
is noteworthy since private renting had almost disappeared: while 76% of households 
privately rented in 1918, only 9% did so in 1991 – a figure that then increased to 12% in 
2001, and to 18% in 2011 (ONS, 2013). This translates into a 1.7 million rise in the number of 
households private renting between 2001 and 2011. The return of the PRS was precipitated 
by the 1988 Housing Act which allowed landlords to more easily retake possession of their 
property and limited the length of tenancies, but it can also be linked to the buy-to-let 
mortgage launched in 1996. In this paper, the focus will be on an expanded definition of 
buy-to-let (BTL) which refers to the possibility this new legislation and mortgage offer to 
purchase a dwelling with the aim of putting it on the private rental market. This definition is 
motivated by the fact that while the BTL mortgage is the most common acquisition model 
among private landlords, the transfer of property to the PRS can occur through multiple 
pathways such as buying outright or through other sources of financing (Scanlon et al., 
2015). The Department for Communities and Local Government’s 2010 Private Landlord Survey 
(DCLG, 2010, page 26) also reports that 23% of the sampled PRS dwellings had not been 
purchased by the landlord, including 9% that had been inherited and 8% that had been built by 
the landlord. 
There is clear evidence that the transfer of properties to the PRS has had a considerable 
influence on the UK housing market in the 2000s. The analysis of the use of the BTL 
mortgage reveals a broad geography of this investment practice (Leyshon and French, 2009) 
and confirms its widespread use: the period from 2003 to 2008 has been called the ‘buy-to-
let boom’ – “by 2007 buy-to-let accounted for 12 per cent of the value of all mortgage 
advances in the UK” (BHSF, 2013, page 15). Sprigings (2008) comes closer to a figure of 30% 
by focusing on buy-to-let (BTL) mortgages as a percentage of house purchase mortgages 
only. There is also evidence that this practice has been far from innocuous. Indeed, there is 
support in the literature for the idea that the ubiquity of buy-to-let investments in UK in the 
first decade of the 21st century has led to an intersection of this practice with gentrification 
trajectories. Indeed, it seems as though BTL investments, driven by the broader incentives 
of the 1988 Housing Act and of the BTL mortgage, have occurred within each of the 
programmes scrutinised by gentrification researchers in the recent investigation of the 
relation between gentrification and public policy (Lees, 2003a, 2008; Lees and Ley, 2008).  
In the case of the policies focusing on social mixing, argued by Lees (2008) to encourage 
gentrification, Murie and Rowlands (2008) report that developers turned to off-plan sales to 
buy-to-let investors to ensure that high-density mixed tenure developments remained 
profitable. There has also been much discussion of the role of buy-to-let in Housing Market 
Renewal1 (HMR) Pathfinders – linked to gentrification in Cameron (2006), Lees (2008) and 
                                                     
1 The Housing Market Renewal (HMR) Initiative “was targeted at nine sub-regional ‘pathfinders’ which included 
26 local authority areas. This programme has subsequently been allocated £2.2 billion to restructure failing 
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MacLeod and Johnstone (2012) – with many highlighting how this trend undermined the 
broader aims of the programme (DCLG, 2009; Nevin, 2010; Turcu, 2012) or how it ultimately 
tended to be a larger driving force in these areas than public investment (Leather and Nevin, 
2013). In the case of the London Olympics – discussed from the perspective of gentrification 
in Watt (2013), critics have been quick to point out how new developments were captured 
by buy-to-let investors (Monbiot, 2007; Sinclair, 2008; Wainwright, 2013) and Bernstock 
(2013) describes the concern from those planning the legacy of the site that the properties 
would be bought up by BTL investors. While there has been no specific study of the 
prevalence of BTL in New Deal for Communities2 (NDC) areas – linked to gentrification by 
Watt (2009) and more marginally by MacLeavy (2009) and Wallace (2015), there is some 
indication that it has also occurred there (Parkinson et al, 2009). The small flats planned 
following NDC council stock transfers (Watt, 2009) are also exactly those most favoured by 
BTL investors (Murie and Rowlands, 2008).  
The aim of this paper is to show that in the UK’s current regulatory context BTL investments 
are intrinsically linked to gentrification. The next section situates this new form of 
gentrification in three theoretical debates. The paper then presents a census-based analysis 
of the geographical distribution of the tenure trajectories that have defined gentrification 
between 2001 and 2011 in England and provides evidence as to the link between BTL and 
gentrification.  
THEORISING BUY-TO-LET AS GENTRIFICATION 
Theorising BTL investments as gentrification confronts three obstacles. The first is that in 
the UK context, gentrification is usually associated with increases in ownership, not renting. 
The second derives from the first: if gentrification is no longer directly connected to buying 
for occupation, then this makes consumption side explanations less useful. The third is that 
BTL investments don’t at first sight appear to be linked to the displacement of low-income 
populations.  
 
                                                     
neighbourhoods and rectify market failure in the target areas over the period 2002–2011” (Nevin, 2010, page 
716). 
2 The New Deal for Communities (NDC) was a programme with a budget of £800 million for projects in small 
neighbourhoods designated as deprived which sought to “position communities ‘at the heart’ of regeneration 
schemes” (MacLeavy, 2009, page 850). 
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Buy-to-let as a possible tenure trajectory in gentrifying areas 
Glass (1988) first identified the process of gentrification in 1963 London, just as home 
ownership had started to increase in a city where there were still more private renters than 
owners. This was before the introduction of Mortgage Interest Relief At Source (MIRAS) and 
a new Housing Act which provided incentives for improvement grants – both instituted in 
1969 and aimed at encouraging home ownership. These new policies seem to have led to a 
shift in real estate investment strategies: “as the return on rented property steadily fell 
behind comparable investment opportunities, landlords by their own volition or by the 
prompting of their agents sought to gain vacant possession and sell” (Williams, 1976, page 
72). The 1977 Rent Act – which prevented unlawful eviction and re-established some 
security of tenure – pushed gentrification even more strongly towards ownership. Thus, by 
from the early 1970s, and at least until the 1988 Housing Act which revalued private rental 
opportunities, gentrification in the UK was occurring through a “process of tenurial 
transformation from private renting to owner occupation” (Hamnett, 1986, page 403). The 
link between gentrification and this transfer to ownership is well established (Butler and 
Lees, 2006; Hamnett and Randolph, 1984; Hamnett and Williams, 1980).  
What is interesting is that gentrification has continued to be tied to homeownership, even 
with the return of private renting. It might be that this return came too late: by the 1990s, 
the study of gentrification had shifted to the “question of why individual owner gentrifiers 
undertake gentrification” (Hamnett, 1992, page 118), taking with it this well-established link 
to ownership. This can explain why in their study of middle class gentrifiers in London, 
Robson and Butler (2001, page 74) excluded non-homeowners from their in-depth 
interviews, something which can also be found in Bondi (1999). This can also explain why 
tenure change, in general, has tended to fall out of recent studies of gentrification in the UK, 
such as in the case of super gentrification (Butler and Lees, 2006) – in which the focus is 
squarely on owner occupiers – or new build gentrification (Davidson and Lees, 2005) – in 
which the presence of renters is noted but not considered significant. UK-based 
gentrification research thus seems to have carried forward the initial, and contingent, link 
between gentrification and ownership. Over half a century later, “it might be that the 
conception of gentrification now needs to include those who rent in such areas” (Butler et al, 
2008, page 86) given the “re-emergence of private landlordism in Britain through what is 
known as ‘buy-to-let’” (Hamnett and Butler, 2010, pages 59-60). 
Inspiration on how to proceed can be found in studies of gentrification elsewhere. Two 
Australian studies provided early evidence that gentrification was not intrinsically connected 
to ownership (Logan, 1982; Maher, 1985). In the same context, Bridge (2001, page 98) 
briefly mentions “gentrifiers buying investment properties” – a phenomenon he later 
reinterprets as the “gentrifier buy-to-let market” (Bridge, 2007, page 40). Still in Australia, 
Rofe (2003, page 2523) notes a trend to ‘rent lifestyle’ among production gentrifiers, those 
living in already renovated terraces or in apartments denigrated by the ‘consumption 
gentrifiers’ who were actively involved in renovating their dwellings. In their analysis of 
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Canadian metropolitan regions, Meligrana and Skaburskis (2005, page 1585) found larger 
percentage increases of renters than owners in the gentrifying areas of a number of cities. 
Recent European scholarship has also noted a diversity of tenure trajectories: in Dutch cities 
through the differentiation of Housing Association owned stock (Huisman, 2014; Teernstra, 
2015), in Swiss cities through the presence of both owners and renters in new build 
developments (Rérat, 2012) and in Brussels through what Van Criekingen (2010) describes 
as a process of ‘rental gentrification’ whereby the PRS is being reinvested following its 
importance for young middle-class adults. 
But three studies are particularly instructive. In Philadelphia, Smith identified three types of 
‘gentrifiers’ – (a) professional developers who purchase property, redevelop it, and resell for 
profit; (b) occupier developers who buy and redevelop property and inhabit it after 
completion; (c) landlord developers who rent it to tenants after rehabilitation” (Smith, 1979, 
page 546) – a typology that assumes the existence of tenure trajectories both to ownership 
and to private rental. This is similar to the findings of DeGiovanni and Paulson’s (1984) 
comparative study of Philadelphia and Atlanta: renters were displaced to make way for 
either wealthier owners or renters. Finally, Engels’ (1999) detailed work on the process of 
gentrification in a Sydney suburb contradicted the (still) popular view that “the 
gentrification process is driven purely by owner-occupiers, not by small-scale absentee 
owners and their middle-class tenants” (Engels, 1999, page 1490).  
It thus seems as though gentrification in the UK has been associated with home ownership 
only because that was the form of tenure which was growing most strongly at the time of its 
early study – linked to the presence of rent controls, incentives to homeowners and the 
growth of house prices (Hamnett and Randolph, 1984). Given that studies elsewhere have 
uncovered a number of different tenure trajectories in gentrifying areas, there appears to 
be no logical contradiction in thinking of BTL investments as a form of gentrification. What 
remains to be found is a way in which this can be reconciled with theoretical models used to 
explain the process.  
Buy-to-let from the perspective of value and rent gaps 
The fact that gentrification has been linked to a variety of neighbourhood trajectories, and 
notably to increases in private renters presents a problem for consumption oriented 
theories. Indeed, a central figure in these theorisations was the figure of what Smith (1979) 
called the ‘occupier developer’, a term which was at the centre of a rather heated exchange 
with Hamnett (1992), for whom “owner gentrifiers should be seen as producing for personal 
use, and not primarily for profit” (Hamnett, 1992, page 118). This issue becomes much less 
relevant with transitions to private rental: with over three-quarters (76%) of dwellings 
owned by a private individual landlord regarded as an investment or pension (DCLG 2010, 
page 29), it cannot be denied that profit, either through capital gains, rental yield or both, 
necessarily underlies most BTL decisions. Two explanations that foreground production 
rather than consumption are particularly useful in accounting for the diversity of tenure 
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transitions involved in gentrification: Hamnett and Randolph’s (1984) value gap and Smith’s 
(1979) rent gap. The account that follows is aligned with Clark (1992) is seeing these two 
theories as meshed rather than in opposition.  
At the core of the value gap’s focus on the difference between tenanted investment and 
vacant possession value – devised for a period in which the transfer from the PRS to 
ownership was the central gentrification trajectory, is the insight that tenure shifts are a 
rational response to competing investment opportunities (Hamnett and Randolph, 1984, 
page 269). The ease with which landlords can retake possession of their property following 
the 1988 Housing Act, declining investment opportunities elsewhere and the social and 
demographic changes of the early 2000s which increased the demand for rental properties 
all made BTL investments a lucrative investment (Scanlon et al., 2015). This can be expected 
to be true in all places to which tenants could potentially be attracted. As such, the value 
gap is “generalisable over space, since policy changes and changes in economic conditions 
surrounding forms of tenure generally affect the entire city region” (Clark, 1992, page 19). 
The broad geography of BTL (Leyshon and French, 2009), and the fact that it is linked to 
most of the large scale programmes initiated in the UK in the 2000s, can thus be understood 
as a generalised response to the new regulatory and financial context.  
The rent gap – “the disparity between the potential ground rent level and the actual ground 
rent capitalized under the present land use” (Smith, 1979, page 545) – is on the other hand 
highly place-specific (Clark, 1992). As such, it can help explain why BTL investments have 
tended to target the lower end of the housing market (DCLG, 2009; NHPAU, 2008; Sprigings, 
2008), to favour types of dwellings more likely to be in central city locations – new builds 
and terraces (Leyshon and French, 2009) – and to be so ubiquitous in the areas undergoing 
regeneration. Indeed, this is something that can’t be completely accounted for by the value 
gap’s insistence that tenure shifts are a reaction to a “profit maximizing opportunity” 
(Hamnett and Randolph, 1984, page 277) – there is no guarantee that the rents obtained in 
these areas would constitute a more profitable investment than the speculative purchase 
and sale of flats for owner occupation in a period of rapid real house price increases 
(Atkinson, 2013, page 2). In targeting these areas, BTL investors must have been looking at 
something else than the relation between tenanted investment and vacant possession, 
namely the fact that a tenure shift – and thus the closure of the value gap – “entails at least 
partial closure of rent gap” (Clark, 1992, page 20) through a long-term increase in land 
prices.  
The tenure shift to the PRS can thus be seen as a means to attract renters to disadvantaged 
inner city areas which have historically not been appealing to owner occupiers. Indeed, 
renters, since they foreground rent levels and accessibility to work and see their stay in the 
area as relatively temporary, can be more easily attracted to areas which may be perceived 
to have less social ‘cachet’, such as new developments on brownfield sites or in areas 
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associated with concentrations of social housing3. There is some support for this idea in 
studies which highlight that trajectories to the PRS have usually occurred in gentrifying 
spaces distinct from those to ownership. For example, in the previously disinvested inner 
city of Brussels gentrification has been led by educated young adults who move in “as 
private renters and for generally short-term periods” (Van Criekingen, 2009, page 844). 
DeGiovanni and Paulson (1984, page 226 and note 20) report that incoming owners and 
renters tended to live in distinct sections of the gentrifying neighbourhoods they studied. 
Finally, both Logan (1982) and Maher (1985) find that the flat building boom in Melbourne 
in the 1960s and 1970s was associated with the arrival of middle class renters, in contrast to 
houses which saw larger increases of owners than renters. 
In the current UK context, BTL investments can thus be thought of as a response to the 
generalised creation of value gaps which provides local opportunities for investors to at 
least partially close the rent gap by introducing middle class renters into disadvantaged but 
central areas. 
Buy-to-let and the potential for displacement 
The explanation for the absence of discussion of BTL in gentrification debates might come 
from the assumption that it is not linked to the displacement of low-income households. 
Indeed, BTL is usually understood as a process through which owners either sell to BTL 
investors or themselves let out their dwelling – in either case, the assumption is that the 
seller has done so voluntarily and is thus not ‘displaced’. What this perspective does not 
consider, however, is the impact that such a transfer to the PRS can have on surrounding 
properties and areas. This is important because BTL investments tend to target the areas 
which house the populations most at risk of displacement. Given the long term focus on 
asset, and thus land value, appreciation, it is also likely that the investor will look to 
progressively rent to tenants wealthier than the area average. 
From these facts it is possible to construct a scenario in which BTL investments could lead to 
the displacement of low income populations: properties in a relatively disadvantaged 
neighbourhood are purchased cheaply but are let to individuals wealthier than the former 
residents. On a wide enough scale, this would likely be associated with both an increase in 
rental yields and in capital value, which would put pressure on remaining renters to vacate 
(through rent increases or the sale of council housing stock). This is a form of indirect 
displacement mechanism similar to that described by Boddy (2007): “indirect displacement 
could occur in areas adjacent to new-build and conversion if the general upgrading and 
increasing desirability of the areas led to prices or rents of existing housing increasing more 
rapidly” (Boddy, 2007, page 99). The potential for rapid increases in rents is clearly present 
                                                     
3 Though this doesn’t necessarily mean that this form of gentrification cannot take advantage of the forms of 
architectural distinctiveness highlighted in Mills (1988) and Zukin (1987). 
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with BTL investments4. This is because of the short stretch of time between each change of 
occupant in the PRS, especially in a context like the UK were there are currently no 
regulations governing rent levels and little security of tenure. This causes a high rate of 
tenant churn: according to the Private Landlords Survey, 44% of tenants had been in the 
property for less than two years (DCLG, 2010, page 36). This churn in many cases entails 
rent increases: 48% of all landlords expected to be able to be re-let their dwelling at a higher 
rent if it became vacant, compared to 52% at the same rent and only 1% at a lower rent 
(DCLG, 2010, Annex 4.10b).  
The fact that the PRS has the potential to effect rapid changes in occupants has been 
documented in a number of cities. In Brussels, Van Criekingen (2010, page 390) describes 
how the high mobility of middle-class young adults in the poorly regulated PRS is 
accompanied by escalating rents. In Chicago, DeGiovanni and Paulson (1984) documented 
intra-neighbourhood moves because of rent increases, renters of higher socioeconomic 
status than residents and a higher than average turnover among neighbourhood renters. 
The case of Sydney also shows that the PRS was quicker at replacing poor tenants by 
wealthier ones than gentrification linked to ownership was at replacing poor owners by 
wealthier ones (Engels, 1999, page 1491). This can be contrasted to the significant times lags 
between the original purchase by gentrifiers and the sale of the dwelling to super-gentrifiers 
(Butler and Lees, 2006; Lees, 2003b).  
From a theoretical perspective then, BTL investments can be linked to gentrification 
because they have the potential to cause the indirect displacement of lower-income 
residents in their vicinity. Given the given the difficulties inherent in measuring 
displacement (Atkinson, 2000; Newman and Wyly, 2006), difficulties compounded by the 
fact that indirect displacement by definition takes time to occur (Davidson, 2008; 
Hackworth, 2002), the extent of this displacement will not be the focus of this paper. It is 
however important to think through the long term displacement trajectories latent in 
particular regulatory changes. 
The theoretical account of BTL as gentrification presented above, taken to its logical 
conclusion, supposes a direct link between a BTL investment created tenure shift and the 
local social upscaling that defines gentrification. The main hypothesis of this account is that 
the deregulation of the PRS has made BTL investments an efficient means to chip away at 
rent gaps in areas unattractive to owner occupiers. The main gentrifying agent involved in 
this process is what Smith (1979) called the landlord developer.  
                                                     
4 The fact that BTL has been linked to a marginal effect on house price growth (NHPAU, 2008) does not mean 
that it has not had a disproportionate effect on local house prices (Sprigings, 2008, 2013), even in Housing 
Market Renewal (HMR) Pathfinders (DCLG, 2009).  
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THE RISE OF LANDLORD DEVELOPERS 
If there is no significant theoretical obstacle to considering BTL investments as a form of 
gentrification, there is still the question of the extent of their empirical manifestation in 
England. It also remains to be shown empirically that there exists a direct link between BTL 
investments and gentrification. These are the aims of this section, which starts with a 
discussion of the method used to identify the tenure trajectories associated with 
gentrification in England and then provides discussions of the geographical specificities of 
these different trajectories and of evidence which tends to support the link between BTL 
and gentrification.  
Identifying social and tenure change 
This study has foregrounded breadth over depth: it uses the opportunities opened by the 
comparison of the 2001 and 2011 UK censuses, for which data is available at very small 
geographies – in this case the Output Area (OA) which contains 300 usual residents on 
average. This an approach followed by a number of recent studies of gentrification (Hedin et 
al, 2012; Meligrana and Skaburskis, 2005; Podagrosi et al, 2011). This study is concerned 
with the 161,296 Output Areas (OA) in England that remained unchanged between 2001 
and 2011 (‘ordinary’ OAs) as well as with the 9,358 2011 OAs formed by the split of 3,096 
2001 OAs following large population change between 2001 and 2011 (‘split’ OAs – this 
occurred if there were more than 625 residents within the 2001 boundary in 2011). These 
OAs are found in 326 Local Authorities, 181 out of which can be considered predominantly 
urban5.  
In line with much gentrification research (Clark, 2005; Hedin et al, 2012; Hochstenbach and 
van Gent, 2015; Ley, 1986), an OA is considered to have experienced gentrification between 
2001 and 2011 if it displays a social upscaling trajectory. While the full details on the 
method used to identify social upscaling (and the results of the robustness tests conducted) 
can be found in Appendix 1, it is worth explaining the broad strokes of this method here. 
The dataset used is the National Statistics Socio-economic Classification (NS-SeC) which 
allocates individuals to one of eight major occupational categories. To ensure maximal 
comparability between 2001 and 2011, it was decided that the focus should be restricted to 
Household Reference Persons (HRPs) aged between 16 and 64.  
                                                     
5 In the analysis that follows, Local Authorities are categorised as urban or rural on the basis of DEFRA’s 2011 
Local Authority based Rural-Urban classification. Though this classification has 6 urban and rural categories, 
these have been consolidated into four for the purpose of this analysis: Urban with Major or Minor 
Conurbation (84 LAs), Urban with City and Town (97 LAs), Urban with Significant Rural (54 LAs), Largely and 
Mainly Rural (91 LAs). For more information on this classification, see Bibby and Brindley (2014). 
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An OA was deemed to have experienced social upscaling if the absolute number of both 
arrivals and departures was larger than a certain threshold (set at 7% of the total number of 
HRPs aged 16-64 in the OA in 2001). To ensure that the social upscaling identified 
corresponds to that usually associated with gentrification, it was decided that these arrivals 
always had to include members of the two first NS-SeC categories (Higher (1) and Lower (2) 
managerial, administrative and professional occupations) and that the departures always 
had to include members of the categories (5) Lower supervisory and technical occupations, 
(6) Semi-routine occupations and (7) Routine occupations. In line with other treatments of 
this data-set, students, those who never worked and the long-term unemployed were 
excluded from the analysis (Hamnett, 2015; Manley and Johnston, 2014).  
These particular criteria yield 11,859 upscaling OAs between 2001 and 2011 (or 7.35% of all 
OAs whose boundaries have remained unchanged between 2001 and 2011)6. But while this 
focus on the co-occurrence of high NS-SeC incomers and low NS-SeC leavers is appropriate 
for ordinary OAs, it is not for split OAs which were unlikely to have large enough departures 
between 2001 and 2011. For these OAs, the important criteria was whether there had been 
more than three times as many arrivals of the highest NS-SeC category (Higher managerial, 
administrative and professional occupations) than of Routine and Semi-routine occupations 
(categories 6 and 7). This approach yields 1,692 OAs in 2011, split from 540 OAs from 2001 
in which arrivals have predominantly been among the highest NS-SeC category (or 18.1% of 
all OAs that have been created following a split between 2001 and 2011). 
The method used to identify the tenure trajectories that have occurred in these upscaling 
OAs is relatively similar to that used for social change, and it is detailed in Appendix 2 along 
with the results of the robustness tests conducted. In short, it aggregates tenure types into 
three main categories (owners, social renters and private renters)7 and uses a similar 
absolute number threshold of 7% of the 2001 OA usual resident population to identify 
changes in the OA’s tenure composition. For split OAs, two types were identified: those in 
which the arrival of owners between 2001 and 2011 was more twice that of private and 
social renters combined, and those in which the arrival of private renters was more than 
twice that of owners and social renters combined.  
In summary, this study is concerned with identifying the tenure changes (or absences 
thereof) which have occurred in upscaling OAs between 2001 and 2011. In doing so, it 
proxies some of the other characteristics of gentrification, which is “not only a social change 
but also, at the neighborhood scale, a physical change in the housing stock and an economic 
                                                     
6 Between 2001 and 2011, these 11,859 upscaling OAs were marked by the arrival of 108,126 high NS-SeC 
HRPs (groups 1 and 2) and the departure of 98,681 low NS-SeC HRPs (groups 5,6.7). For all OAs in England 
however, there were similar arrivals for both types of HRPs (around a quarter of a million each). Intense social 
change is an extremely localised phenomenon.   
7 This grouping of tenure categories is not unproblematic. For example, Watt (2009) discusses the often 
contentious transfer of Local Authority housing to Registered Social Landlords in London. 
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change in the land and housing markets” (Smith, 1987, page 463) in the absence of local 
rent and income measures (Schaffer and Smith, 1986). It is now possible to turn to the 
gentrification trajectories which took place between 2001 and 2011 in England. 
The multiple neighbourhood trajectories of English gentrification 
Table 1 below lists the tenure trajectories that were found to be the most prevalent in 
upscaling ordinary OAs (accounting for 95.4% of the total).  
Table 1: The tenure changes most prevalent in upscaling ordinary OAs in England between 
2001 and 2011 
 
In the rest of the article, the focus will narrow to three ‘pairs’ of tenure trajectories 
accompanying ordinary social upscaling in which there is only one origin or destination 
tenure category (the others are assumed to a combination of the ‘primary’ changes). In each 
of these pairs, the final destination is either ownership or the PRS. These are: 
- The replacement of social tenants by individuals either privately renting (SR->PR; 285 
OAs) or owning (SR->O; 216 OAs), which can occur through the sale on the open 
market by Councils or Housing Associations of social rented properties, which are 
then purchased and either inhabited or put for rent by the new owner (as a BTL 
investment). This can be achieved through refurbishment or by knocking down 
estates and rebuilding in the same place. Direct displacement is a clear possibility 
here. 
Tenure change in upscaling ordinary OAs Abbreviation 
Number of OAs 
in which tenure 
change occurred 
Unidentifiable tenure change UTC 5,357 
Replacement of owners by private renters O->PR 1,451 
Sole decrease in owners O- 1,201 
Minimal tenure change in majority 
ownership OA 
Sweat Equity 
Gentrification (SEG) 
957 
Sole increase in private renters PR+ 801 
Sole increase in owners O+ 677 
Replacement of social by private renters SR->PR 285 
Replacement of social renters by owners SR->O 216 
Increase in owners and private renters O&PR+ 174 
Replacement of owners and social renters by 
private renters 
O&SR->PR 114 
Replacement of social renter by owners and 
private renters 
SR->O&PR 83 
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- Sole increases in individuals private renting (PR+; 801 OAs) or owning (O+; 677 OAs), 
achieved if subdivision or rebuilding/densification leads to more units of that type, 
without the data showing a change in the other two tenure types. Where the final 
destination is the PRS, BTL investments are likely to have played a large role. Direct 
displacement can occur in PR+ if incoming (higher NS-SEC) private renters are 
numerous enough to mask departing (lower NS-SEC) private renters. In other cases, 
indirect displacement is most likely. 
- Sweat Equity Gentrification (SEG; 957 OAs): upscaling OAs in which home-owners 
were the majority in 2001 (twice as numerous as social and private renters 
combined) and where there was no major disruption in the tenure mix (to ensure 
this is the case, the threshold used for other tenure trajectories was here halved – 
see Appendix 2 for details). In these OAs, any social change must be predominantly 
accommodated within the ranks of the area’s homeowners – presumably through 
lower NS-SeC owner occupiers selling to incoming higher NS-SeC individuals – 
though some of it could also be incumbent upscaling. If instead of a purchase by 
another owner occupier the dwelling is acquired by a BTL investor or if the owner 
decides to put the dwelling on the PRS, then the tenure trajectory would consist of a 
replacement of owners by private renters (O->PR; 1,451 OAs). Indirect displacement 
is most likely here.   
These six trajectories are clear evidence of the multiple neighbourhood trajectories 
associated with gentrification (Engels, 1999) in what can be considered ‘ordinary’ OAs. But 
these changes have occurred alongside much larger scale developments, some of which can 
be understood as New Build Gentrification (NBG) following Davidson and Lees (2005). Here, 
another pair of upscaling split OAs has been identified: the upscaling split OAs in which 
more than twice as many new residents are owners than private or social renters (379 OAs) 
and those in which more than twice as many residents are private renters than owners or 
social renters (669 OAs). These can be labelled ‘new build’ ownership gentrification (NBOG) 
and ‘new build’ BTL gentrification (NBBG) respectively. Indirect displacement in surrounding 
areas is a possibility here. 
What emerges from all these figures are two broad categories of tenure trajectories: those 
halves of the pairs which have ownership (SEG; O+, SR->O; NBOG) and those which have the 
PRS (O->PR; PR+; SR->PR; NBBG) as final tenure destination. The latter tenure trajectories 
are what can be labelled as ‘buy-to-let gentrification’, and these have a numerical 
advantage. Based on the criteria laid out in the preceding section, buy-to-let gentrification 
occurred in 3,206 OAs between 2001 and 2011, as compared to 2,229 for what can be called 
ownership gentrification. It thus seems as though landlord developers have acquired a 
crucial role in recent English gentrification. As the next section will show, these two types of 
gentrification trajectories also have very different geographies. 
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The geography of English gentrifications 
The map in Figure 1 below shows the centroids (with size increased for legibility) of 
upscaling OAs, both ordinary and split, separated out according to whether the tenure 
trajectories had ownership (black dots) or the PRS (white dots) as their final destination. On 
the map, the darkest shading represents the most urban Local Authorities under the DEFRA-
ONS Rural-Urban Classification. 
Figure 1: Buy-to-let and ownership gentrification in England (OA centroid size increased for 
legibility). 
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It seems as though BTL gentrification has taken over from ownership gentrification in the 
most central areas of the most urban English Local Authorities. The rest of this section will 
provide numerical evidence for this and show that BTL gentrification also took place in areas 
that were more disadvantaged in 2001.  
The more ‘urban’ nature of BTL gentrification can easily be shown for England as whole: the 
84 Local Authorities categorised as ‘urban with a major or a minor conurbation’ (out of the 
326 LAs in England) concentrate just over half of all BTL gentrification (50.1%). Another 
27.5% of BTL gentrification is found in LAs in the second most urban category (‘urban with 
city and town’), leaving only 22.4% for the 145 more rural LAs. In contrast, 50.9% of 
ownership gentrification occurred in the two most rural types of LAs. The prominence of BTL 
gentrification in more urban LAs also holds for 8 of the 9 English regions (with only the 
North East showing similar proportions of both types of gentrification across urban and rural 
LAs).  
It is also the case that tenure changes associated with BTL gentrification have occurred more 
‘central’ places, with density taken as a proxy: ownership gentrification occurred in OAs with 
an average 2011 population density of 30.6 persons per hectare, compared to 100.6 persons 
per hectare for OAs with BTL gentrification. This is true for each pair of tenure changes and 
it is also the case for the 63,828 OAs located within the LAs categorised as predominantly 
Urban with a Major or Minor Conurbation (UMMC) by DEFRA-ONS.  
The final characteristic that sets BTL and ownership gentrification apart is the social 
composition of the OAs targeted. To show this, OAs were categorised based on the relative 
number of HRPs aged 16-64 in NS-SeC groups 1 (Higher managerial and professional 
occupations) as compared to those of groups and 6 and 7 (Semi-routine and Routine 
occupations) combined in 20018. Compared to all OAs in England, gentrifying OAs with both 
trajectories to ownership and to the PRS were less likely to be in OAs with a predominance 
of higher NS-SeC residents and more likely to be in OAs where both high and low NS-SeC 
groups were present in 2001. However, 45% of ordinary BTL gentrification occurred in OAs 
which had a predominance of HRPs of groups 6 and 7, compared to just over 26% for 
ordinary ownership gentrification. A look at the individual tenure trajectories confirms the 
overall impression that BTL gentrification has led the gentrification of OAs with a 
predominance of low NS-SeC HRPs: 70% of all gentrification in these OAs has occurred 
through trajectories to the PRS. 
                                                     
8 This cannot be extended to split OAs as it requires a 2001 resident population for each OA. A threshold of 
more than three times was used to categorise the OAs. These results are robust to the following changes: 
using NS-SeC groups 1 and 2 combined instead of just group 1; using NS-SeC groups 5, 6 and 7 combined 
instead of just groups 6 and 7; using thresholds of over 2 or over 1.5 times rather than of over 3 times to 
delimit categories.  
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The fact that BTL gentrification occurred more often than ownership gentrification in more 
disadvantaged areas in 2001 also finds support in data on local house prices, here the ONS’ 
House Price Statistics for Small Areas (HPSSAs) provided at the MSOA level9. Table 2 below 
shows the ratio of the average house price for MSOAs with upscaling OA trajectories to the 
PRS to those with OA trajectories to ownership. The overall picture is one of lower 2001 
house prices where trajectories to the PRS occurred, and this is the case in each of nine 
regions of England and for each pair of tenure trajectories (with new builds in the East of 
England as the only notable exception to this pattern).  
Table 2 Ratio between the 2001 average house prices of MSOAs containing gentrifying OAs 
with transitions to ownership and the PRS  
 
There thus seems to be a clear spatial separation in the operation of gentrification: between 
2001 and 2011, BTL gentrification has been most prevalent in more urban, central and 
disadvantaged OAs than ownership gentrification. This is true for vast majority of English 
regions and holds for both ordinary and split OAs. These results support the idea that the UK 
legislative and financial context of the early 21st century have allowed BTL investments to be 
used to extend gentrification to disadvantaged but centrally located areas in England’s 
                                                     
9 MSOAs are OA-weighted as a MSOA value is counted in the tenure trajectory average for every one of its OAs 
with the relevant trajectory (the findings are similar without duplicate MSOAs). The house prices used are for 
all types of dwellings. 
 
Tenure 
trajectory pair 
East 
Midlan
ds 
East of 
Englan
d 
Londo
n 
North 
East 
North 
West 
South 
East 
South 
West 
West 
Midlan
ds 
Yorksh
ire and 
The 
Humb
er 
BTL / 
ownership 
gentrification 
0.77 0.88 0.91 0.71 0.83 0.74 0.82 0.81 0.85 
O->PR / SEG 0.76 0.82 0.89 0.73 0.72 0.74 0.81 0.71 0.74 
PR+ / O+ 0.75 0.92 0.87 0.75 0.79 0.75 0.90 0.74 0.80 
SR->PR /  
SR->O 
 
0.96 0.85 0.89 0.78 0.77 0.81 0.87 0.88 0.97 
NBBG / NBOG 0.92 1.35 0.86 0.71 0.95 0.74 0.62 1.00 1.01 
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largest cities unreachable through ownership gentrification. It however remains to be 
shown that the aim of BTL investments more generally has been to use the newly created 
value gaps to close rent gaps across England.  
Testing the theoretical link between BTL and gentrification 
The theoretical model used posits that BTL investors are taking advantage of the 
deregulation of the PRS (and thus responding to the opening of a value gap) to attract 
wealthy tenants to disadvantaged but central areas unattractive to owner occupiers (and 
thus working to close the rent gap). Taken to its logical conclusion, this supposes an 
intention by BTL investors to effect social change through tenure change. While the fact that 
most landlords in the DCLG’s 2010 Private Landlord’s Survey indicated that they regarded 
their PRS properties as an investment or pension points in this direction, it is also possible to 
use the results of the Census based analysis to provide more empirical verification. This is 
because a general pattern seems to underlie the spatial distribution of shifts to the PRS – a 
pattern which poses problems for the idea that BTL investors were indifferent as to the 
social changes occurring in the areas they purchased in. To show this, the focus will be on 
the ONS’ 2011 Area Classification for Local Authorities10, with the relevant figures shown in 
table 3 below.  
Starting with the frequency of shifts to the PRS, investors appear to have targeted those 
places with the largest reservoirs of high NS-SeC tenants. Here, central London clearly 
stands out: in 2001, the 20 London boroughs that make up categories 3a and 3b of the ONS’ 
Area Classification housed 9.1% of all HRPs in England but 26.2% of all HRPs of NS-SeC group 
1 in the PRS, figures which yield a location quotient for both combined of 2.9. These same 
two London categories make up 8.5% of all OAs in England but 14.3% of those with shifts to 
the PRS between 2001 and 201111, yielding a combined location quotient of 1.68. The link 
between high NS-SeC tenants in 2001 and shifts to the PRS between 2001 and 2011 also 
seems verified for most of the other categories, with relatively high values in both for 
categories 4 and 5 and low values in both for categories 1 and 8.  
The second important dimension is the geographical distribution of social upscaling and 
downscaling within shifts to the PRS, with the trajectories associated with downscaling the 
inverse of those associated with upscaling – see Appendix 1 for details. The results are 
                                                     
10 The ONS’ 2011 Area Classification for Local Authorities uses a cluster analysis on socio-economic and 
demographic data from the Census to identify areas of the country with similar characteristics. More 
information, including maps of the groups and sub-groups obtained, can be found at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-
method/geography/products/area-classifications/ns-area-classifications/ns-2011-area-
classifications/index.html 
11 This does not include split OAs. These have not been included in the analysis here because social 
downscaling in this type of OAs seems to be linked with overcrowding rather than large capital investments as 
in the case of upscaling.  
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surprising here: shifts to the PRS are less ‘successful’ at achieving upscaling in the Greater 
South East (the regions of London, South East and East of England) than in the rest of 
England. While they account for 42% of all OAs, these three regions represent 60% of all 
downscaling OAs with shifts to the PRS. Looking at this from the perspective of the Area 
Classification, it clearly emerges that the differences in the ratio between upscaling and 
downscaling across categories are mainly due to the tenure trajectory O->PR, where 
downscaling sharply outnumbers upscaling in every category, and to some extent PR+ in the 
more suburban ones, with the relation between downscaling and upscaling remaining 
largely positive and relatively constant across categories for SR->PR. 
The fact that O->PR had a lower ‘success rate’ can be explained by the absence of a ‘natural 
limit’ for this tenure trajectory when compared to PR+ and SR->PR. This can be linked to its 
lower capital requirements – all this tenure trajectory requires is that a property from the 
existing stock be put for sale. This contrasts with the other trajectories in which the 
properties released are linked to specific real estate schemes, be it small new builds, sub-
divisions or council estate regeneration. From this perspective, the low success rate of O-
>PR can be explained as the result of the uncoordinated action of BTL investors all 
interested in the same areas without there being a significant limit to the release of 
properties. 
The spatial distribution of upscaling and downscaling shown table 3 thus seems to have 
emerged from an oversupply of PRS properties through the O->PR trajectory in the most 
sought after areas in relation to the number of potential high NS-SeC tenants. As high NS-
SeC tenants are likely to favor accessibility and thus central city locations, this oversupply is 
most manifest in more suburban locations as these tenants are sucked into inner city 
properties. There is indeed a clear difference between the ‘cities’ (groups 3b and 5) and 
their ‘suburbs’ (groups 3a, 4 and 7) in terms of the ratio between upscaling and 
downscaling. The fact that the other three groups (1,6 and 8) had under-representations of 
high NS-SeC tenants and were not in the most sought after regions seems to have afforded 
investors the space to take less risks.  
Both the survey information and the spatial distribution of shifts to the PRS that actually 
occurred between 2001 and 2011 point towards a general logic that seems to go against the 
idea of a BTL investor indifference to social change. Thus, while it is of course not the case 
that every single transfer to the PRS will inexorably cause gentrification, the distribution of 
these transfers does seem to accord with a general intention of BTL investors to attract high 
NS-SeC tenants. 
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Table 3: Relation between upscaling and downscaling in OAs with shifts to the PRS for 
England and its regions  
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has shown that much of the gentrification which took place in the 
neighbourhoods of English urban regions between 2001 and 2011 can be traced back to the 
use of BTL investments by landlord developers. In contrast to the historical attachment of 
UK gentrification to ownership and direct displacement, this points to the operation of 
gentrification through a diversity of tenure and displacement trajectories. In turn, this re-
legitimises a production centred approach that points to the meshed nature of value and 
rent gaps. The analysis of census data lent support to the idea that BTL investments pushed 
gentrification into previously unreachable areas, a response to the value and rent gaps 
created in the most central and disadvantaged sections of England’s cities by the 
deregulation of private renting and the introduction of the BTL mortgage. There is also 
strong evidence that BTL as an investment practice is intrinsically linked to gentrification 
trajectories. 
The important issue here is that the rise of the landlord developer is linked to the existence 
of both significant rent gaps in the inner cities and to value gaps produced by the current UK 
policy context. This can help explain why despite a sharp slowdown in new BTL loans 
following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, these have now returned to levels close to the 
pre-crisis peak (Scanlon et al., 2015, page 4). Similarly, while there have been recent 
reductions in the advantages enjoyed by BTL investors (increased stamp duty and changes 
to mortgage tax relief), Scanlon et al. (2015) note that demand for private renting will likely 
continue increasing. While these two phenomena may have affected the value gap, they 
 
Location quotients: Upscaling to downscaling ratios: 
NS-SeC 
group 1 
in the 
PRS 
(2001) 
shifts to 
the PRS 
(2001-
2011) 
O->PR PR+ SR->PR 
English Countryside (1) 0.61 0.65 0.79 1.47 5.71 
London Cosmopolitan Central (3b) 3.72 1.49 1.04 1.49 2.37 
London Cosmopolitan Suburbia 
(3a) 
1.75 1.95 0.26 0.33 0.83 
Suburban Traits (4) 0.98 1.32 0.34 0.53 1.23 
Business and Education Centres (5) 1.20 1.24 1.08 1.36 1.68 
Coast and Heritage (6) 0.75 1.19 0.75 1.12 1.00 
Prosperous England (7) 1.25 0.69 0.43 0.85 2.10 
Mining Heritage and 
Manufacturing (8) 
0.36 0.86 1.16 1.45 1.37 
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have not done so to the point where it is no longer profitable to use the transfer of 
properties to the PRS as a means to close rent gaps. This type of gentrification will thus 
likely continue as an “unassailable capital accumulation strategy for competing urban 
economies” (Smith, 2002, page 443). 
The example of UK BTL gentrification in the first decade of the 21st century thus brings out 
the importance of the regulatory context in which the housing market operates. Given the 
intersection of value and rent gaps, any change to the regulatory context which leads to the 
creation of value gaps will also likely facilitate the closing of existing rent gaps. The tenure 
transfers that ensue are far from innocuous. This was already clear in Hamnett and 
Randolph’s (1984) account of the transfer of dwellings from the PRS to ownership in 1970s 
London but can be seen more generally in the commonly accepted link between 
gentrification and the transfer of dwellings to ownership. The case of the UK clearly shows 
how each swing of the pendulum between ownership and the PRS – to ownership in 1970s 
and back to the PRS in the 2000s – creates vast opportunities for asset appreciation for 
those able to take advantage of the newly created value gaps to chip away at existing rent 
gaps at the same time as displacement trajectories for those who happen to be in the way.  
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ONLINE APPENDICES 
Identifying social upscaling and downscaling in ordinary Output Areas 
The identification of the Output Areas (OAs) in which there has been a social upscaling 
trajectory between 2001 and 2011 relied on the analysis of the datasets CAS045 NS-SeC of 
Household Reference Person (HRP) by age (of HRP) from the 2001 UK Census and LC6101EW 
- NS-SeC by sex by age - Household Reference Persons from the 2011 UK Census.  
The NS-SeC dataset allocates individuals aged 16-74 to eight major occupational categories 
on the basis of their occupation title and of information on their employment status, 
whether they are employed or self-employed and whether or not they supervise other 
employees. These eight categories are:  
1. Higher managerial, administrative and professional occupations;  
2. Lower managerial, administrative and professional occupations;  
3. Intermediate occupations;  
4. Small employers and own account workers;  
5. Lower supervisory and technical occupations;  
6. Semi-routine occupations;  
7. Routine occupations; and  
8. Never worked and long-term unemployed.  
According to the ONS’ 2011 Census Glossary of Terms (ONS, 2014), a Household Reference 
Person (HRP) is an individual within a household chosen to characterise the whole 
household. If the person lives alone, then it is the HRP. If a household contains only one 
family, then the HRP is the Family Reference Person (FRP). In a lone parent family, the lone 
parent is the FRP. In a couple family, the “FRP is chosen from the two people in the couple on 
the basis of their economic activity (in the priority order: full-time job, part-time job, 
unemployed, retired, other). If both people have the same economic activity, the FRP is 
identified as the elder of the two or, if they are the same age, the first member of the couple 
on the form” (ONS, 2014, 18). In the case of multi-family households, the HRP is chosen 
among the FRPs using the same criteria as in the case of the selection of the FRP in a couple 
family. The same goes for a household with ungrouped individuals. As described in the body 
of the text, only HRPs aged between 16 and 64 were included in the analysis (thus excluding 
those 65-74). This decision was motivated by two reasons: 
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- an error in ONS’ processing of the 2001 Census which under-estimated the number 
of economically inactive individuals aged 65-74 who had never worked. ONS 
estimates the shortfall to be in the region of 150,000-200,000 for England and 
Wales. 
 
- the large proportion (21.1%) of individuals in the category ‘CS0450055 Not 
classifiable for other reasons : ALL HRPs’ in the 2001 NS-SeC dataset, a category 
which does not exist for the 2011 NS-SeC dataset. Given that the analysis uses 
absolute changes in the numbers of HRPs to measure upscaling, such a large loss of 
data for 2001 could have an influence on local OA trajectories. For example, it is 
possible that 20 high NS-SeC HRPs categorised as ‘Not classifiable for other reasons’ 
in 2001 are then categorised correctly in 2011. This would appear in the analysis as a 
significant increase in the number of high NS-SeC HRPs in the OA without any actual 
social change. As 89.3% of HRPs aged 65-74 were in this ‘Not classifiable for other 
reasons’ category in 2001, it was decided to exclude this age range from the analysis 
to minimise this issue. Without this age range, the proportion of ‘Not classifiable for 
other reasons’ in the 2001 data falls to 8.3%. 
Using only the age range 16 to 64 thus alleviates some of the issues with the 2001 NS-SeC 
dataset. The decision to use HRPs instead of usual residents is motivated by the same 
attempt to reduce the influence of the ‘Not classifiable for other reasons’ category to a 
minimum. If usual residents are used instead of HRPs, the proportion of ‘Not classifiable for 
other reasons’ moves back to 16% of all values in the 2001 NS-SeC dataset.  
For social upscaling to occur between 2001 and 2011, the two first NS-SeC categories 
(Higher (1) and Lower (2) managerial, administrative and professional occupations) had to 
feature among the arrivals into the OA and the groups (5) Lower supervisory and technical 
occupations, (6) Semi-routine occupations and (7) Routine occupations had to feature 
among the departures. As presented in the table 6 below, groups 3 and 4 could either be 
attached to the arrival of higher NS-SeC HRPs or to the departure of the lower NS-SeC HRPs. 
Students, those who never worked and the long-term unemployed were excluded from the 
analysis. 
Table 6 below presents the 11,859 OAs (or 7.35% of all ordinary OAs, those whose 
boundaries have remained unchanged between 2001 and 2011) where social changes have 
been considered as upscaling. As discussed in the body of the paper, an OA was deemed to 
have experienced social upscaling if the absolute number of both arrivals and departures 
was larger than a certain threshold. For the purpose of the analysis this threshold was set at 
7% of the total number of HRPs aged 16-64 in the OA in 2001, but with a minimum value of 
5 for OAs with less than 71 HRPs (one standard deviation below the mean 2001 OA total 
HRP population) and with a maximum value of 7.8 for OAs with over 111 HRPs (one 
standard deviation above the mean 2001 OA total HRP population). The minimum and 
maximum values are there to ensure that variations in OA HRP population are taken into 
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account without nonetheless enabling thresholds that are either very small (less than 3.5 for 
an OA with less than 50 HRPs) or very large (over 14 for OAs with more than 200 HRPs). 
While this method may potentially capture some generalised in situ upward shifts in the NS-
SeC distribution – in other words upscaling without residential movement – this seems quite 
unlikely given the strict criteria used here. Indeed, a significant number of HRPs would have 
had to shift from NS-SeC categories 5,6&7 to categories 1&2 within a 10 year period. There 
is also some numerical evidence that this has not occurred on a large scale in England 
between 2001 and 2011. Among the 11,859 OAs defined as upscaling, only 136 OAs (or 1.2% 
of all upscaling OAs) had not experienced any significant change in either their age 
structure, ethnic structure or country of birth profile. More precisely, these 136 OAs were 
the only upscaling OAs with a relatively similar mean age in 2001 and 2011 (with an increase 
of more than 5 years – an increase of 10 years being the expected outcome in the case of a 
perfectly stable population) and limited changes in ethnic terms (with changes in both those 
of White British and non-White British ethnicity contained between -10 and 10 individuals 
between 2001 and 2011) and in terms of country of birth (with changes in both those born 
in and outside of the UK contained between -10 and 10 individuals between 2001 and 
2011). 
Social change 2001-2011 Selection criteria 
Number of 
OAs with 
7% std. 
dev. 
threshold x 
4567 down, 123 up 4<0 & 567<0 & 12>0 & 3>0 & 4567<-x & 123>x 4,949 
3567 down, 124 up 3<0 & 567<0 & 12>0 & 4>0 & 3567<-x & 124>x 3,327 
34567 down, 12 up 3<0 & 4<0 & 567<0 & 12>0 & 34567<-x & 12>x 1,520 
567 down, 123 up 567<0 & 3>0 & 12>0 & 567<-x & 123>x 765 
567 down, 124 up 567<0 & 4>0 & 12>0 & 567<-x & 124>x 591 
4567 down, 12 up 4<0 & 567<0 & 12>0 & 4567<-x & 12>x 359 
3567 down, 12 up 3<0 & 567<0 & 12>0 & 3567<-x & 12>x 295 
567 down, 12 up 567<0 & 12>0 & 567<-x & 12>x 53 
Table 6: Criteria used to identify upscaling social changes in OAs between 2001 and 2011 
 
To ensure that the figures in the table above are not too sensitive to the criteria and 
threshold chosen, a number of robustness tests were conducted. First, a number of 
different criteria were tested at the 7% specification described above.  
The broadest one included all OAs in which there was a shift upwards in the NS-SeC 
composition of the OA. In addition to the eight trajectories in Table 6, this meant including 
trajectories such as ‘567 down, 1234 up’ (6,226 OAs, the largest category) or ‘567 down, 34 
up’ (462 OAs) and yielded 18,865 upscaling OAs. As can be expected, this specification 
produced large numbers of potential ‘gentrifiers’ and ‘displaced’ but groups 3 and 4 play a 
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large role in these movements. For example, in these upscaling OAs, there were 71,373 
arrivals of HRPs from groups 1 and 2 combined as compared to 46,474 for groups 3 and 4 
combined.  
In contrast, the strictest specification entailed using only those trajectories where groups 1 
and 2 alone increased. From Table 6 above, it can be seen that this yielded 2,227 OAs (or 
about 1.4% of all upscaling ordinary OAs in England). This has the advantage of completely 
taking out the influence of groups 3 and 4 but produces the very small figure of an arrival of 
11,023 HRPs from groups 1 and 2 combined.  
In between these two extremes, two other specifications were tested. The first only allowed 
increases to group 123 and yielded 8,104 upscaling OAs. The other is the one finally chosen 
in which the central criteria is that any upscaling OA included the arrival of groups 1 and 2 
and the departure of groups 5, 6 and 7, yielding 11,859 upscaling OAs (or 7.35% of all 
ordinary OAs in England). This method was found to be preferable as it takes into account 
both arrivals and departures. In any case, both of these produced similar results: 2.6 times 
more arrivals of 12 than 34 and 2.3 more departures of 567 than 34 for upscaling only to 
123 and 2.4 and 2.5 respectively for the chosen specification.  
The idea here is that some degree of flexibility regarding the presence of 3 and 4 as arrivals 
in gentrifying areas seems realistic given the number of OAs which have seen an arrival of a 
majority of groups 1 and 2, accompanied by some 3 or 4. This can be linked to the fact that 
groups 3 and 4 were those which increased the most between 2001 and 2011 – it is thus to 
be expected that they co-vary to some extent with both high and low NS-SeC groups. 
However, the important point is that tenure trajectories to the PRS always outnumber those 
to ownership in upscaling OAs, whatever the specification discussed here is chosen. The gap 
is narrowest for the strictest criteria (the 2,227 OAs where upscaling is only to groups 12) – 
418 vs 396 OAs. It is widest for the broadest criteria (the 18,865 OAs with any upward shift 
in NS-SeC composition) – 4,272 vs 2,860. It falls somewhere in the middle for the chosen 
specification (the 11,859 OAs in which arrivals had to include groups 1 and 2 and departures 
groups 5, 6 and 7) – 2,651 vs 1,881. This indicates that trajectories to the PRS (and thus BTL 
investors) have indeed played an important role in gentrification in England during the first 
decade of the 21st century.  
As concerns the threshold used to determine what population movements were significant 
enough to count as upscaling, four strategies were tested for the broadest specification 
presented above (and which yielded 18,865 upscaling OAs at the 7% threshold). The first 
used an absolute number threshold to determine which changes were significant – 
thresholds of 0, 5 and 10 were tested, yielding 40,634, 22,522 and 7,090 upscaling OAs 
respectively. The second used a percentage of the total HRP population as an absolute 
threshold. This yielded 26,678 upscaling OAs at a 5% threshold and 10,607 at a 10% 
threshold. A third method used the change in the share of the NS-SeC groups to determine 
which changes were significant. A requirement of a 1% change in the share of the groups 
yielded 34,724 upscaling OAs. This dropped to 14,779 for a 2.5% change in the shares and to 
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2,519 for a 5% change in the shares. The fourth method is the one outlined above (absolute 
threshold set at 7% of the HRP population with minimum and maximum thresholds based 
on +/- one standard deviation from the average 2001 HRP population at OA level), and 
which is a combination of the absolute and percentage methods. In general, it yields a 
number of upscaling OAs (18,865) in the middle of the distribution. 
Social downscaling trajectories were identified using the same criteria as upscaling: both 
arrivals and departures had to be above a threshold set at 7% of the total number of HRPs 
aged 16-64 in the OA in 2001, but with a minimum value of 5 for OAs with less than 71 HRPs 
(one standard deviation below the mean 2001 OA total HRP population) and with a 
maximum value of 7.8 for OAs with over 111 HRPs (one standard deviation above the mean 
2001 OA total HRP population).  Students, those who never worked and the long-term 
unemployed were likewise excluded from the analysis and NS-SeC groups 3 and 4 could also 
be attached to the arrival of higher NS-SeC HRPs or to the departure of the lower NS-SeC 
HRPs. However, this time the two first NS-SeC categories (Higher (1) and Lower (2) 
managerial, administrative and professional occupations) had to feature among the 
departures from the OA and the groups (5) Lower supervisory and technical occupations, (6) 
Semi-routine occupations and (7) Routine occupations had to feature among the arrivals. 
The social trajectories linked to social downscaling are listed in table 7 below. To maintain a 
symmetry with social upscaling, trajectory 12->34567 was not considered as downscaling. 
This yields a total of 10,397 ordinary OAs with social downscaling trajectories in England 
between 2001 and 2011, as compared to the 11,859 OAs with upscaling trajectories.  
 
Social change 2001-2011 Selection criteria 
Number of 
OAs with 
7% std. 
dev. 
threshold x 
123 down, 4567 up 12<0 & 3<0 & 4>0 & 567>0 & 123<-x & 4567>x 3,845 
124 down, 3567 up 12<0 & 4<0 & 3>0 & 567>0 & 124<-x & 3567>x 4,069 
1234 down, 567 up 12<0 & 3<0 & 4<0 & 567>0 & 1234<-x & 567>x 1,033 
123 down, 567 up 12<0 & 3<0 & 567>0 & 123<-x & 567>x 235 
124 down, 567 up 12<0 & 4<0 & 567>0 & 124<-x & 567>x 239 
12 down, 4567 up 12<0 & 4>0 & 567>0 & 12<-x & 4567>x 635 
12 down, 3567 up 12<0 & 3>0 & 567>0 & 12<-x & 3567>x 651 
12 down, 567 up 12<0 & 567>0 & 12<-x & 567>x 50 
Table 7: Criteria used to identify downscaling  social changes in OAs between 2001 and 2011 
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Identifying tenure change in ordinary Output Areas 
Table 8 below lists the criteria used to identify the tenure trajectories derived from the 
analysis of the datasets Tenure - People, 2001 (UV43) and Tenure - People, 2011 (QS403EW) 
from the 2001 and 2011 UK Censuses respectively. The symbols SR, PR and O in table 8 
below represent the change in the number of residents within the tenure categories ‘social 
renting’, ‘private renting’ and ‘owning’ respectively between 2001 and 2011.  
Tenure change 2001-2011 
Selection criteria (based on the 2001-2011 change in O, PR 
and SR) 
Number of OAs 
with 7% std. 
dev. threshold x 
Increase in all three tenure types O>x & SR>x & PR>x 1,689 
Decrease in all three tenure types O<-x & SR<-x & PR<-x 20 
PR up PR>x & -x<SR<x & -x<O<x & PR>2*(O+SR) & PR>-2*(O+SR) & 
PR>2*max(O & SR) & PR>-2*min(O & SR) 
14,589 
O up O>x & -x<SR<x & -x<PR<x & O>2*(SR+PR) & O>-2*(SR+PR) & 
O>2*max(SR & PR) & O>-2*min(SR & PR) 
7,036 
SR up SR>x & -x<O<x & -x<PR<x & SR>2*(O+PR) & SR>-2*(O+PR) & 
SR>2*max(O & PR) & SR>-2*min(O & PR) 
2,022 
PR down PR<-x & -x<SR<x & -x<O<x & PR<2*(O+SR) & PR<-2*(O+SR) & 
PR<2*min(O & SR) & PR<-2*max(O & SR) 
212 
O down O<-x & -x<SR<x & -x<PR<x & O<2*(SR+PR) & O<-2*(SR+PR) & 
O<2*min(SR & PR) & O<-2*max(SR & PR) 
16,207 
SR down SR<-x & -x<O<x & -x<PR<x & SR<2*(O+PR) & SR<-2*(O+PR) & 
SR<2*min(O & PR) & SR<-2*max(O & PR) 
2,927 
O and SR up O>x & SR>x & -x<PR<x & O>2*PR & O>-2*PR & SR>2*PR & 
SR>-2*PR 
596 
O and PR up O>x & PR>x & -x<SR<x & O>2*SR & O>-2*SR & PR>2*SR & 
PR>-2*SR 
5,774 
PR and SR up PR>x & SR>x & -x<O<x & PR>2*O & PR>-2*O & SR>2*O & 
SR>-2*O 
2,267 
O and SR down O<x & SR<x & -x<PR<x & O<2*PR & O<-2*PR & SR<2*PR & 
SR<-2*PR 
383 
O and PR down O<x & PR<x & -x<SR<x & O<2*SR & O<-2*SR & PR<2*SR & 
PR<-2*SR 
100 
PR and SR down PR<x & SR<x & -x<O<x & PR<2*O & PR<-2*O & SR<2*O & 
SR<-2*O 
26 
O & SR down, PR up O<-x & SR<-x & PR>x 1,362 
PR & SR down, O up PR<-x & SR<-x & O>x 20 
O & PR down, SR up O<-x & PR<-x & SR>x 16 
PR down, O & SR up PR<-x & O>x & SR>x 15 
O down,  PR & SR up O<-x & PR>x & SR>x 2,043 
SR down, O & PR up SR<-x & O>x & PR>x 1,968 
SR down, PR up SR<-x & SR<2*O & PR>x & PR>2*O & -x<O<x 3,537 
SR down, O up SR<-x & SR<2*PR & O>x & O>2*PR & -x<PR<x 2,918 
O down, PR up O<-x & O<2*SR & PR>x & PR>2*SR & -x<SR<x 20,721 
O down, SR up O<-x & O<2*PR & SR>x & SR>2*PR & -x<PR<x 715 
PR down, O up PR<-x & PR<2*SR & O>x & O>2*SR  & -x<SR<x 201 
PR down, SR up PR<-x & PR<2*O & SR>x & SR>2*O & -x<O<x 43 
Minimal tenure change in O 
majority areas in 2001 
-(x/2)<O<(x/2) & -(x/2)<SR<(x/2) & -(x/2)<PR<(x/2) &   
O_2001 > 2*(SR_2001 + PR_2001)               
9,442 
Minimal tenure change in SR 
minority areas in 2001 
-(x/2)<O<(x/2) & -(x/2)<SR<(x/2) & -(x/2)<PR<(x/2) &   
SR_2001 > 2*(O_2001 + PR_2001)               
564 
Minimal tenure change in PR 
minority areas in 2001 
-(x/2)<O<(x/2) & -(x/2)<SR<(x/2) & -(x/2)<PR<(x/2) &   
PR_2001 > 2*(O_2001 + SR_2001)               
23 
Unidentifiable tenure change All remaining OAs 63,860 
Table 8: Criteria used to identify tenure changes in OAs between 2001 and 2011 
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In the same way as for the identification of social change, the threshold was set at 7% of the 
total population of the OA in 2001 but with a minimum value of 16.4 for OAs with less than 
234 residents (one standard deviation below the mean 2001 OA total population) and with a 
maximum value of 24.4 for OAs with over 347 residents (one standard deviation above the 
mean 2001 OA total population). As for the social change, this is to ensure that variations in 
OA population are taken into account without nonetheless producing thresholds that are 
either very small (less than 10 for an OA with less than 140 residents) or very large (over 35 
for OAs with more than 500 residents). 
As can be seen in Table 8, the criteria chosen to identify tenure changes is based on two 
main ideas. First, for any change in the tenure categories to be significant, the departures 
and arrivals that constitute it have to be larger/smaller than the chosen threshold. This is 
similar to the criteria used to identify social upscaling above. The difference lies in the 
second criteria which is that in any movement which does not involve all three tenure types 
(either through the replacement by one type by another or through the sole increase in one 
tenure category), the tenure types not concerned should always be half as large (or small) as 
those which underwent change. This can be illustrated by comparing two OAs. In the first 
(E00000028) there has been an increase of 36 private renters alongside a decrease of 6 
social renters and of 40 owners. There is no doubt that the trajectory O->PR best describes 
this tenure trajectory. This can be contrasted to the case of OA E00082917 in which there 
was an increase of 78 private renters in parallel to a decrease of 33 owners and 19 social 
renters. In this case there is also a similarity to the O->PR trajectory but the large loss of 
social renters also makes it possible that the trajectory is closer to O&SR->PR. Neither of 
these can be chosen with any certainty however: O->PR because owners are clearly not the 
only type of residents leaving the OA and O&SR->PR because the departure of social renters 
is below the threshold of 7% of the OA population (21.8 for this particular OA). Together, 
these two criteria thus ensure that the tenure trajectories identified are robust.  
The downside to this approach is the high number of OAs in which a tenure trajectory 
cannot be identified with enough certainty. The close to 40% of all OAs in England in this 
situation can thus be thought of as ‘incomplete’ or ‘hybrid’ tenure trajectories. But it is still 
possible to say something about the general trends in these ‘unidentifiable’ OAs. Indeed, 
they show a similar broad movement towards the private rental sector: between 2001 and 
2011, these ‘unidentifiable’ OAs saw the arrival of 872,309 private renters, alongside the 
departure of 293,090 owners and 116,175 social renters. It is thus likely that many of these  
take incomplete forms of the tenure trajectories O->PR, SR->PR or PR+. The high number of 
O- trajectories (16,207) is also noteworthy in this context. Together, they represent the 
departure of 644,386 owners. At the same time, these OAs have seen the arrival of 116,429 
private renters (and only 8,867 social renters) and 37.4% of them have increases of over 10 
private renters. Again, some of these O- may be incomplete O->PR trajectories.  
The criteria chosen to identify tenure change trajectories from this census dataset thus 
produce a high number of OAs which cannot be precisely allocated to the ‘pure’ tenure 
trajectories in Table 8. But they ensure that the tenure trajectories that are identified are 
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unique and clearly distinguished. As for the identification of social upscaling, a number of 
robustness tests have been carried out as concerns the threshold used to separate out 
significant changes in the tenure categories.  
Table 8 below shows the figures obtained for the tenure trajectories discussed in the body 
of the text for the same four methods used to define the threshold as were presented in the 
section above on social change. What is immediately clear is that the ratio between tenure 
trajectories to the PRS and to ownership is high for low thresholds but decreases in line with 
increases in the threshold. This can be explained by looking at the tenure trajectory ‘MTC, O 
majority’ more carefully. This category is responsible for all of the increase in the number of 
tenure trajectories to ownership when the thresholds get stricter. The reason for this is 
simple: this trajectory is defined as those OAs in which home-owners were the majority in 
2001 (twice as numerous as social and private renters combined) and where there was no 
major disruption in the tenure mix. It thus follows that a higher threshold for disruption in 
the tenure mix will, in a context such as England where ownership is the majority tenure, 
naturally produce more such OAs at the expense of the other tenure trajectories.  
 
 
Abs. 
15 
Abs. 
25 
Abs., 
35 
Pct. 
5% 
Pct. 
10% 
Pct. 
15% 
Share, 
5% 
Share 
10% 
Share
15% 
Pct. 
Std. 
dev. 
5% 
Pct. 
Std. 
dev. 
7% 
Pct. 
Std. 
dev. 
9% 
O->PR 29337 15836 7902 28958 11714 4226 44715 21738 9447 28962 20721 14118 
PR+ 13929 14378 12314 13378 13707 10823 2297 594 188 13541 14589 14209 
SR->PR 5309 2560 1026 5429 1649 403 8504 3128 996 5384 3537 2124 
             
MTC, O 
majority 
18761 43589 64913 18598 54574 80043 37644 75109 91984 18819 33630 48399 
O+ 6790 6487 5069 6853 6191 4224 1109 332 103 6914 7036 6425 
SR->O 3576 2321 1224 3724 1756 579 5514 2794 1039 3671 2918 2084 
             
UTC 26057 27727 21208 26592 26116 15323 31664 25918 14220 26528 29321 27348 
             
PRS / O 1.8 0.6 0.3 1.7 0.4 0.2 1.3 0.3 0.1 1.7 0.9 0.5 
MTC, O 
majority 
as % of 
O 
trajecto
ries 
34.0 54.4 70.2 33.3 61.6 79.9 49.6 72.1 85.7 33.6 46.1 57.4 
Table 8: Number of OAs per tenure trajectory to ownership or the PRS for four types of 
thresholds. 
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The easiest way out of this situation would be to select a high threshold while taking out the 
trajectory ‘MTC, O majority’ from the analysis. This would however cause a serious bias by 
focusing only on tenure disruptions and ignoring the social changes that occur within the 
ranks of homeowners. The solution chosen here is to be define the lack of disruption in the 
tenure mix more strictly by using half the threshold value. An example is illustrative here. If 
the full value of the threshold x were taken, an OA in which there were over 60 movements 
in or out of tenure categories would still be categorised as having experienced a minimal 
tenure change. This would be the case for OA E00054149 in Bradford with a total population 
of 379 in 2001 and thus a threshold x=24.4 having seen the departure of 23 owners and the 
arrival of 22 social renters and 24 private renters between 2001 and 2011. With x/2, the 
most ‘extreme’ OA categorised as a minimal tenure change is OA E00078518 in Swindon 
which had a population of 375 in 2001, x=24.4 and experienced 34 movements in or out of 
tenure categories: a departure of 10 owners and 12 social renters alongside an arrival of 12 
private renters. Overall, the average number of movements in tenure categories drops from 
24.1 to 13.7 with only x/2 as a threshold for minimal tenure change. This approaches shifts a 
large percentage of the formerly ‘MTC, O majority’ OAs to the category ‘unidentifiable’ but 
ensures that this category is meaningful and not just a residual.  
As in the case of social change, the choice of the specification of a change larger than 7% of 
the 2001 OA population bounded by a standard deviation on either side is motivated by the 
search for a compromise between the absolute number and the pure percentage approach. 
But it also emerges from a downside of the change in shares approach. Table 8 shows that 
the number of OAs categorised as PR+ and O+ remain relatively constant across all 
specifications except those that are based on the change in shares. The stability can be 
explained by the fact that in the case of O+ and PR+ all the change is concentrated in one 
category and is thus likely to be more robust to changes in the threshold than for tenure 
changes where large changes are needed in two or more of the categories. The near 
disappearance of these two tenure trajectories with the use of shares can be linked to the 
fact that these tenure trajectories involve by definition only marginal decreases, if any, 
changes in the other two tenure categories. To effect a change in the shares thus requires 
very large arrivals of either private renters or owners. For example, in a hypothetical OA 
with a hundred residents of each tenure type in 2001, and assuming two out of the three 
remain constant, an arrival of 90 residents is necessary to effect a 15% change in the shares. 
This is a much larger OA level change that required by any other of the specifications and 
this specification was thus considered as sub-optimal as compared to the other 
specifications. 
 
 
 
